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The proliferation of "law reform" litigation over the last two de-
cades confirms again Tocqueville's famous comment on our national
character: There is scarcely a political issue that we neglect to turn
into a question for the courts. The term "law reform" by itself sug-
gests legislation, or perhaps even revolution, rather than ad-
judication. Faced with one regulation that trenches too deeply on
religion or another that upholds too rigidly the more lupine practices
of established wealth, other peoples might turn to the legislatures or
to the streets. We, however, rustle together our lawbooks and our
briefs, and head for the courthouse.
There is, of course, nothing new in using the courts to change the
law. Litigation always "reforms" the law at least minutely; even the
most routine personal injury or contract case raises some slight new
bump on the corpus juris.' But law reform is a matter of degree.
The sort of case we have come to identify with this movement is a
kind of political drama: the big-issue litigation, wide-ranging, bold
and exciting, affecting broad classes of persons and confronting huge
government bureaucracies. Moreover, such cases purport to repre-
sent the unrepresented-the poor, the oppressed minorities or wo-
men, the aged and the children, the scattered nature-lovers-in
short, those who through ignorance or despair, skepticism or poverty
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or inertia, would not be heard at all if not for the enterprise of the
public interest lawyer.2 Though law reform is more than melo-
drama, the basic elements are there: the downtrodden victim, the
heroic defender, the giant villain, well-heeled and heedless to need
and virtue; and of course, the courtroom as the stage. The drama is
very much a part of law reform, and win or lose, the law reformers
have used litigation to focus our attention on some of our most press-
ing national needs.
The law reform movement has been quieter of late, however, per-
haps because the law reformers have already mined so thoroughly
the most emotional themes of the '60s and '70s, notably civil rights
and early environmental issues. The current pause invites reflection
on law reform, and a reassessment of the reformers' implicit promise
that litigation can pave the road to the new millennium.
Joel Handler's new book is a part of this reassessment. In it the
author strives to place the law reform movement in the context of
social reform movements generally. Within that context he turns to
social science in order to set forth "a theoretical framework for evalu-
ating the 25-year experience of social-reform groups and law-reform
lawyers."'3 This framework attempts to link the factors that cause
any particular law reform effort to succeed or fail. The author first
outlines five of these factors, or as he calls them "variables," drawing
particularly on political science literature. Then he narrates a series
of case studies of law reform efforts in the areas of environmental law,
consumer protection, civil rights, and social welfare, analyzing all
these cases according to his 5 success-predicting factors. In the final
chapter, Handler reassesses the 5-factor analytic framework itself and
arrives at some rather pessimistic conclusions about the prospects for
law reform through litigation. Because the book is bound to be used
as a starting point for future analyses, it is important to take account
of its major assertions, and to note, too, some of its more troublesome
aspects.
Handler's achievement is to draw together a great variety of vi-
gnettes from the annals of law reform activities, and give us some
common categories by which to descibe, explain, and evaluate those
activities. This is no small accomplishment. "Law reform" encom-
passes a wide spectrum of subjects, and I have no doubt that future
2. See, e.g., Rabin, Abandoning Our Illusions: An Evaluation of A/iemative Approaches to Law
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commentators will look to Handler's categories when they too at-
tempt to make sense of the plethora of cases that have been described
as "public interest litigation." Each category describes some factor
that may contribute to the success or failure of a given law reform
effort; hence the presence or absence of a given factor, says the au-
thor, may permit us to evaluate the probability that any particular
effort will succeed.4 Since these factors are so central, a brief sum-
mary is in order.
The first factor is designated "characteristics of social reform
groups," by which the author means chiefly the reform groups' abil-
ity to attract and hold supporters. Relying particularly on Mancur
Olson's Logic of Collective Action,5 he postulates that the central prob-
lem for all social reform efforts is the "free rider": Since social reform
may benefit many different people, the individuals who might bene-
fit may see little connection between their individual efforts and the
ultimate goal, and may simply decide to let others carry the burden.
Handler argues that to overcome this problem a reform group may
have to offer individual supporters or leaders what he terms "selec-
tive incentives" '-that is, additional personal pay-offs such as money
or prestige. The greater the group's ability to offer these "selective
incentives," Handler argues, the greater its chances for success.6
The second success-predicting factor, the "distribution of benefits
and costs," also refers to the degree to which individuals feel person-
ally affected by the reform effort. If benefits are concentrated on a
few persons, the author suggests, those persons may be more easily
mobilized to support the movements; conversely, if the costs are con-
centrated on a few opponents, they will resist more strenuously. Ac-
cording to Handler, the costs of reform usually are concentrated on a
few while the benefits are widely distributed-the least favorable
constellation for mobilizing support and overcoming opposition.'
The third factor, which the author calls the "bureaucratic contin-
gency," and the fourth factor, "judicial remedies," both focus on the
difficulties a reform group faces when the remedy it seeks can only be
achieved through numerous discretionary decisions of dispersed offi-
cials. If a law reform group must litigate an issue on a case-by-case
basis against one official after another, the chances for success
4. The author refers to these factors as "independent variables," with "success" as the
"dependent variable." See, e.g., p. 34.
5. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcTION (1965) [hereinafter cited to Schock-
en edition (1968)].
6. Pp. 5-14. This section draws especially on M. OLSON, supra note 5, at 47-52.
7. Pp. 14-18.
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decline.8
Finally, in his discussion of the factor "characteristics of law re-
formers," the author examines law reform as a branch of social re-
form movements, and argues that the chances for success improve as
the law reformers are more closely affiliated with a broadly based
social reform group that generates publicity and political support.9
Useful though these factors may be for classifying the prospects
and problems of law reformers, they present a difficulty that is, in
effect, the mirror image of the book's major virtue. Handler's termi-
nology itself sometimes obscures important distinctions. Take, for ex-
ample, the "bureaucratic contingency," which denotes the difficulties
a law reform effort faces when its objective requires numerous or
complex decisions by government officials. Handler describes how
law reform groups, when faced with issues of this sort, may exhaust
their resources in fragmented litigation, problems of proof, and post
hoc policing of recalcitrant officials. The author's illustrations and
comments on this problem are one of the strongest features of the
book, most particularly in his discussion of environmental litigation.
But even granting that officials do not like to change their accus-
tomed ways, why should we assume that, beyond mere inertia, they
will systematically attempt to evade their legal duties? Such a calcu-
lated effort depends in part on the content of the law reform issue at
stake, and on the officials' commitment to the older policy.'0 Can we
realistically lump official resistance to school integration, say, with
official resistance to automobile air bags? There may also be a prob-
lem in treating several different types of officials under one label.
Might not elected officials behave differently from appointees? Or
appointees of some agencies or some administrations from appointees
of others? The "bureaucratic contingency" includes a suspiciously
wide spectrum of bureaucrats. Handler does not hide this problem.
He remarks, for example, that the Carter administration's appoint-
ments of old Naderites may make a difference in the way consumer
agencies perform." But we get no account of those differences.
An equally pervasive problem is the perplexingly incomplete dis-
cussion of the social science theories underlying the book's analysis,
particularly in the sections that present the author's pyschosocial the-
8. Pp. 18-25.
9. Pp. 25-33.
10. See, e.g., Rabin, Lawyersfor Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN.
L. REv. 207, 243-44 (1976).
11. Pp. 76-77, 79.
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ory of reform movements. We learn, for example, that Mancur Ol-
son thinks that the "free rider" problem is the chief impediment to
successful organization of social movements with economic goals, but
that he does not think the "free rider" analysis makes much sense
with respect to philanthropic groups, where the group goal carries no
ascertainable personal benefit for participants. 12 We learn also that
William Gamson disagrees, and thinks that the "free rider" analysis
does apply to such groups. 13 Whom does Handler follow? Gamson.
Why? We have very little idea, because the cursory discussion tells us
almost nothing about the issues that divide the theorists.
This cryptic treatment of theory haunts the later portions of the
book, where the "free rider" analysis becomes confusing. It seems to
designate two quite separate groups: (1) persons who desire some re-
form goal but expend no effort to achieve it, because they think they
can rely on the efforts of others; and (2) persons who expend no effort
because they do not care about the goal at all. 4 The former is easily
comprehensible, but the latter is puzzling. How can people who do
not share the goal be taking any sort of a "ride"? The unspoken
presupposition is a concept of "benefit" that goes beyond the individ-
ual's desires, but this is a notion that carries a great deal of philo-
sophical freight. Where is the discussion to support that conception?
Apparently Handler's expanded use of the "free rider" language
flows from Gamson, but the sparse discussion leaves us uncertain.
Similarly, in citing James Q. Wilson, Handler suggests that low
income persons cannot readily be drawn into social movements un-
less they are offered some material incentive; appeals to mere altru-
ism do not go far with them. 5 This claim seems rather offensive on
its face, and certainly warrants some supporting discussion. Handler,
however, appears to accept the idea on Wilson's authority. The only
bit of considered discussion of the point comes late in the book, where
Handler concludes that Wilson's view is supported by the saga of the
National Welfare Rights Organization. 6
Again, still relying on Wilson, Handler suggests that individuals
and groups are more likely to respond to the threat of loss than to the
12. P. 6; See M. OLSON, supra note 5, at 159-62.
13. Pp. 6-7.
14. A particularly striking example of this double meaning of "free rider" occurs in the
author's discussion of school integration. See pp. 109-11.
15. P. 8; see pp. 110, 159. Wilson's statement of this thesis is related to a personal sense
of efficacy and trust in others. See J. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 56-75 (1973).
16. P. 159. J. WILSON, sura note 15, at 64-68, also uses a welfare rights organization
example to illustrate the point.
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possibility of gain.' 7 But at least some of the law-and-economics
writers assume that dollars lost weigh no more than dollars gained,'
and here too we would like to hear more about the bases for the
argument. One could multiply examples of this peculiarly abrupt
treatment of other authors' work, most notably in the concluding
chapter's sweeping references to the natural ossification process of so-
cial movements-but enough is enough. No doubt time and space
have limited Handler's discussion of his sources. But at times he sim-
ply names authority and then proceeds, and at critical points author-
ity threatens to replace analysis.
The brevity of the theoretical discussion may indeed lie at the
root of another of the book's dissatisfying features: the uncertainty of
the theory of "incentives." Again citing Wilson, he speaks of three
types of incentives. The supposedly strongest, "material," refers to
things like money and jobs; the next, "solidarity," apparently refers
to the enjoyment of being with one's bowling team or tennis club or
some such group; the third and weakest is "purposive," which seems
to encompass all the other reasons for which people support causes,
although this term also doubles as a synonym for "altruism."' 9 A ma-
jor difficulty is that Handler sometimes uses "incentive" as a kind of
tautology, and as such the term loses its power to explain. Here is an
example from the school integration case study:
There were other incentives operating among the black groups.
Clearly selective incentives were important for recruiting leaders.
The NAACP was not only challenged by SCLC, but SNCC and
the Congress of Racial Equality [CORE] also rose to prominence.
Moreover, within each organization, there were rivalries among lo-
cal leaders and aspiring leaders. In addition, there were loners,
such as James Meredith, and clergymen with their own churches.
Again, there is a diversity of opinion as to whether the proliferation
and competition among black social-reform groups was a benefit or
a loss to the movement as a whole, but no one denies that selective
incentives were powerful in motivating people who wanted to be
leaders. 20
This passage tells us very little about incentives, "selective" or other-
wise; nor does the language of "incentives" add anything to the dis-
cussion of leadership. That leaders were on the scene seems to prove
that they had "incentives" to be there.
The vexations of the "incentives" analysis distract the reader
17. P. 14.
18. Se, e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
19. Pp. 7-8; see J. WILSON, supra note 15, at 33-5 1.
20. P. 110.
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from several extremely interesting questions that Handler touches
but does not treat systematically. One is the question of the kind of
"incentives" (if any) that can ensure that reform leadership will be
dedicated, intelligent, and imaginative. In this respect, is it clear that
"material incentives" are so strong and "purposive incentives" so
weak? Certainly the Nader-related groups do not rest on this suppo-
sition. On the contrary, the Nader groups' low salaries and incredi-
ble workload seem precisely calculated to weed out those who lack
dedication; starvation wages and all, morale was certainly high
among the original Raiders. Why? Perhaps Nader's charisma ex-
plains it, or perhaps it was because the Raiders knew that they were
smart, hard working, and creative, and that whenever some congress-
man showed the slightest interest, they could be right there with the
goods. 2 To his credit, Handler does not hide the problem of defin-
ing relevant incentives; indeed he tells us that public interest lawyers
as a group are ready to sacrifice salary for their dedication to a
cause.
22
Another serious gap in the incentive analysis concerns the place
of foundation funding. Handler occasionally mentions that founda-
tion funding has been crucial in some law reform efforts. Indeed,
foundation funding seems to constitute an alternative to the whole
baggage of mobilizing popular support-"selective incentives," "free
riders," and all.23 But we need to know how foundations get in-
volved in law reform efforts. The author does discuss the closely
related issue of law reform groups' "alliances" with outside
organizations, particularly government agencies,24 but he neglects to
say when and why such alliances might be formed with foundations.
While he suggests that law reformers must appeal to a foundation's
"purposive incentives '"25 he leaves unclear how the institutional
"purposive incentives" of foundations compare to the "purposive in-
21. See, e.g., p. 93. Robert Fellmeth, one of the original Raiders, made some interesting
observations on "incentives" in a recent interview: "I get upset about people always being
advocates for their own group. Women proselytizing for women. Blacks organizing and
making careers out of promoting blacks. I could never do that. If I were a minority, say a
Polish Jewish handicapped person, the last group I would think to represent would be Polish
Jewish handicapped persons. It doesn't seem right to me. I want to represent someone else."
Jenkins, Nader's Raiders Ten Years After, STUDENT LAw., Nov. 1978, at 39.
22. Handler, Ginsberg & Snow, The Public Interest Law Indusit, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW 47 (B. Weisbrod ed. 1978).
23. Pp. 12-13, 27; see Handler, Ginsberg & Snow, supra note 22, at 53.
24. Some examples of such alliances appear in the case studies on consumer protection
in Wisconsin, pp. 79-82, and on the implementation of the Voting Rights Act, pp. 118-29.
25. See, e.g., p. 128.
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centives" of individual people. To be sure, foundation officers want
to know how a particular project fits the foundation's purposes. But
what is the source of these foundation purposes, and what causes
them to change over time? How influential is the notorious "old
boy" network, and what is the role of sheer faddism or paper-push-
ing?26 Just as important, how do foundation funding decisions influ-
ence the direction of law reform activities by recipient groups?
27 If
foundations can substitute for popular support in law reform efforts,
and particularly if foundation funding policies do significantly affect
the content of law reform activities, then we need to know much
more about the incentives that draw foundations into law reform.
Whether the focus is on individuals or on foundations, one won-
ders if it makes sense to discuss "mobilization" or "incentives" apart
from the content of the cause at stake. Robert Rabin has suggested
that certain issues, particularly discrimination and free speech, touch
questions that many perceive as fundamental to our enterprise as a
nation, and organizations focusing on issues of this sort may always
be able to count on some response in our society.28 If this is so, and I
think it is, then the content of a reform group's goal may be central
in determining its ability to draw support, and a formal analysis,
with no systematic reference to substantive goals, may only partially
explain a group's success or failure. Moreover, as we all know, differ-
ent reform issues attract attention at different times. Why is this so?
Though Handler gives no systematic explanation, he is certainly
aware that reform enthusiasms shift over time, and at several points
alludes to dramatic events or leadership that set off a particular re-
form wave.29 To Handler's credit, he never claims to set forth more
than a partial explanation of the success or failure of law reform liti-
gation, and his case studies make no attempt to conceal the elements
that fall between the cracks of his formal analysis-the importance of
the substantive purposes, the impact of a Martin Luther King or
Ralph Nader, or the riveting shock of the civil rights murders. These
matters have no niche in his formal analysis of the factors required
for "success."
The prediction of a law reform movement's "success" is, of
course, the ostensible purpose for which the author sets out his 5-
26. See, e.g., Kwitny, FordFoundation Mulls Crime Fight, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1976, at 22,
col. 4.
27. See Komesar & Weisbrod, The Public Interest Law Firm: A Behavioral Anal sis, in PUB-
LIC INTEREST LAw, supra note 22, at 96-97.
28. Rabin, supra note 10, at 221.
29. See, e.g., pp. 39, 73, 123.
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factor analysis. Merely to define "success" in the law reform context
is ambitious, and here too the author's performance is often provoca-
tive but somewhat mixed. Handler grapples with the amorphous
concept of "success" by dividing it into three components: (1) suc-
cess-as-tangibles-getting more goods and services for the target
group; (2) success-as-indirect-results-attaining such benefits as bar-
gaining leverage, publicity, and, most important, legitimation; and
finally (3) success-as-pluralism--opening up the political process to
new and ever-expanding numbers of previously underrepresented
persons.3 °
The fullest and most concrete discussion of "success," both in the
case studies and in the final chapter's wrap-up, is on the first level.
Litigation is sometimes a very inefficient method for improving the
material or political well-being of an underrepresented group, and as
Handler himself very ably illustrates, a litigating group may win law-
suits and still not materially benefit the underrepresented group, par-
ticularly when the practical difficulties of case-by-case litigation or
enforcement are overwhelming.3' What he leaves unexplored, how-
ever, is the possibility that the very undertaking of litigation may
actually harm the underrepresented group by diverting its energies
from more productive endeavors. To some degree, litigation must
operate within the context of existing laws; at times' those laws con-
tain no handles for litigators to grip. Take the "block grant" alloca-
tions under the Community Development Act.32 In this "New
Federalism" program, federal funds are dispersed to cities on a
formula basis, ostensibly for the primary benefit of low and moderate
income residents. One of the most important sections of the Act is
obviously the statutory allocation formula, since it determines the
relative percentages of grants for deteriorating, older, central cities
on the one hand, and robust suburbs on the other. The formula is
crucial to low-income residents of older cities, yet this formula is vir-
tually untouchable through litigation. 33
30. Pp. 36-39.
31. Pp. 192-208.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (1976), as amended by Housing and Community Develop-
ment Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-557, 92 Stat. 2080.
33. Another serious difficulty is that the statute gives litigators almost no lever by which
to require local officials to spend these funds on low income projects; the 1978 amendments to
the Act have imperiled HUD's effort to ensure that at least 75% of local expenditures would
be made for the benefit of low and moderate income persons. See Housing and Community
Development Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-557, 92 Stat. 2080 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5301-5317 (1976)). The statute itself thus shunts litigation into such discouraging periph-
eral channels as the adequacy of the local Housing Assistance Plan or "citizen participation"
May 1979]
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In an instance of this sort, where litigation may be useless to bring
tangible results to an underrepresented group, the group really ought
to be doing something other than litigating. Even where litigation is
technically feasible, it may divert attention and resources from po-
tentially more effective techniques of political organization. The
courts, after all, are in form the most aristocratic of our political insti-
tutions, insulated as they are from the ordinary hurly-burly of poli-
tics. 34 Handler tells us that social reformers use the legal system
because they are weak. 35 But a more sobering issue is whether law
reform litigation may weaken even further an underrepresented
group: If a reform organization becomes too mesmerized by the
elaborate minuet of litigation, the membership may neglect to go
pound on the door at city hall.
But this is old hat. Commentators as far back as Thayer have
warned against the dangers of overmuch reliance on the courts in
political affairs, 36 and Handler himself is certainly aware of the diffi-
culty.37 So are the most inventive of the law reformers, such as the
Nader groups, who use litigation as only one among several devices
by which to reform the law.
Another difficulty with the treatment of "success" appears when
Handler distinguishes the first level "tangible success," which he
equates with the law reform group's own goals,38 from the second
level of "success-as-indirect-results" (such as increased bargaining
leverage, publicity, and legitimation): These supposedly "indirect"
results are frequently in fact the law reformers' most important goals.
Indeed, the traditional or tangible success of winning a lawsuit may
be entirely secondary among the law reformers' desiderata. 39 From
Handler's own case studies, for example in the environmental area,4°
measures. See, e.g., City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1977);
Ulster County Community Action Comm., Inc. v. Koenig, 402 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Handler would undoubtedly discuss this problem under the aegis of the "bureaucratic contin-
gency": The statute vests too much discretion in local officials for successful litigation. My
concern, however, is that litigation itself might cause the client group to lose tangible benefits
if litigation diverts the group from more effective organizing projects.
34. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-28 (1962).
35. P. 232.
36. J. THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1893).
37. See, e.g., p. 33.
38. This is stated explicitly at p. 191: "They sued because they wanted something. Did
they get it?"
39. The author himself mentions the difficulty of separating direct and indirect results
of litigation. See pp. 209-10.
40. See, e.g., p. 63.
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the reader cannot but sense that just this political use of litigation
makes the law reformers' work so novel. Here are lawyers who may
care less about winning a favorable judgment than about delaying
some noxious project in order to insert themselves into the bargain-
ing process and gain a platform for the views of an otherwise disre-
garded constituency. Handler himself points out that these
nontraditional uses of litigation are among the most interesting and
important aspects of the law reform movement. 4' But the final chap-
ter analyzes these nontraditional goals far too tentatively: Handler
in effect abandons the discussion of "success" in this political sense
because he thinks it so difficult to measure publicity or legitima-
tion.42 My own view is that the pursuit of precisely these nontradi-
tional goals lends to law reform an aspect of theater; and very serious
theater at that. Perhaps it is just the political dramaturgy of law
reform that eludes the author's obvious wish to apply scientific lan-
guage and models. Indeed, it may be that a social science model of
law reform is bound to be incomplete without the aesthetic leavening
of linguistics or rhetoric.
In discussing the third level of success, "success-as-pluralism," the
author is at his gloomiest, predicting that law reform will fall short of
revitalizing pluralism. He argues that social reform organizations
generally have a kind of natural evolution, resulting either in their
gradual atrophy, or in their co-option by government or other "es-
tablishment" organizations. The reform organizations' use of law re-
form, he says, does nothing to alter this basic natural history; if
anything, law reform accelerates the process of decay.43
Interesting though this analysis may be, it has virtually no sup-
port in the case studies; it rather rests almost wholly on the author's
extrapolations from the theories of yet another group of social science
authorities. Thus, Handler's final pessimism about law reform seems
strangely removed from the remainder of his study.
Because this lugubrious grand finale is unconvincing, one might
conclude that the history of law reform to date gives us reasonable
ground for cheer. Certainly there are some social reform move-
ments-including those that have continually used litigation, such as
the American Civil Liberties Union-that have not yet either col-
lapsed altogether or merged with the "establishment." And what if
they collapse or merge? Surely pluralism is not defunct simply be-
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cause individual social reform movements go through a natural life-
cycle. The important point is that new interests continue to emerge,
not that any particular movement or organization lasts forever. Nor
need co-option be a fate worse than death for the social reform or-
ganization. We might speculate that co-option comes precisely when
the reformers gain access and become respectable to the political es-
tablishment. But again, co-option of one group of social reformers
need not prevent the emergence of new dissidents and new reformers.
The author is surely right that law reformers are unlikely to alter
the basic life history of social reform movements, and certainly they
are unlikely to toll the bells of social revolution. The significance-
and indeed the excitement--of the law reform movement lies rather
in its use of traditional institutions in nontraditional ways. The most
imaginative and creative of the law reformers have sensed the theat-
rical possibilities in those very staid institutions, and have ushered in
some hitherto unknown casts of characters to dramatize a set of con-
cerns that have resounded only weakly in our other political institu-
tions. Naturally, the particular play is sometimes a flop-often due
to one or another of the difficulties included in Handler's 5-factor
analysis. But the author's final pessimism aside, his case studies sug-
gest that social reform will never be quite the same, and neither will
the courts. Despite the author's personal melancholy about law re-
form, one concludes this ambitious study thinking that law reform
litigation has after all helped to invigorate a number of social reform
efforts, and that whether or not future social reformers turn to law
reform, they cannot but think of the courts as a potential forum for
unconventional political messages.
[Vol. 31:977
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